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Abstract 
Molecular biologists exploit information conveyed by mechanistic models for 
experimental purposes. In this contribution, I make sense of this aspect of biological 
practice by developing Keller’s idea of the distinction between ‘models of’ and ‘models 
for’. ‘Models of (phenomena)’ should be understood as models representing phenomena 
and they are valuable if they explain phenomena. ‘Models for (manipulating 
phenomena)’ suggest new types of material manipulations and they are important not 
because of their explanatory force, but because of the interventionist strategies they 
afford. This is a distinction between aspects of the same model; in molecular biology, 
models may be treated either as ‘models of’ or as ‘models for’. By analyzing the 
discovery and characterization of restriction-modification systems and their exploitation 
for DNA cloning and mapping, I identify the differences between treating a model as a 
‘model of’ or as a ‘model for’. These lie in a cognitive disposition of the modeler towards 
the model. A modeler will look at a model as a ‘model of’ if he/she is interested in its 
explanatory force, or as a ‘model for’ if the interest is in the material manipulations it can 
possibly afford. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Models can be used in many ways to achieve a number of different purposes (Morrison 
and Morgan 1999). For instance, models are used to draw inferences about a target 
system, as measuring instruments, as experimental systems (1999, p 20-21), to explain, or 
to construct other models. In molecular biology, models are used not only as tools to shed 
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light on phenomena or theories, but also to design new experimental strategies (Morange 
1998). In Rheinberger’s own words, “molecular biology (…) is governed by methods 
rooted in the molecular tools that operate in the living cell itself” (2007, p 220). Here 
Rheinberger is implicitly saying that knowledge of tools operating in the living cell can 
provide solid grounds for biological experimental methods. Since knowledge in 
molecular biology is expressed mainly in the form of mechanistic models (Craver and 
Darden 2013), Rheinberger’s claim can be interpreted as saying that molecular biologists 
take advantage of (or take inspiration from) mechanistic models to develop new 
experimental strategies. This aspect of mechanistic models has not been properly 
appreciated in philosophical studies of biology. Philosophy of biology has mainly 
focused on explanatory aspects of mechanistic models. To fill the gap in the literature, 
here I aim to understand the role that mechanistic models have in the development of 
experimental strategies. In particular, the question I am interested in is: What is the 
relation between mechanistic models and experimental strategies in molecular biology?  
 I will answer this question by borrowing and developing a distinction made by 
Evelyn Fox Keller. In (2000), Keller discusses the relation between theory and practice in 
biology and she mentions a distinction between ‘models of’ and ‘models for’. ‘Models 
of’ (phenomena) should be understood as models representing phenomena, while ‘models 
for’ (manipulating phenomena) are models that suggest new types of material 
manipulations, i.e. tools for material change. In Keller’s terms, ‘models of’ are 
theoretical in the sense that they are aimed at explaining accurately specific aspects of 
biological phenomena, while ‘models for’ are valuable not because they represent 
accurately or explain phenomena (though they might), but because they suggest strategies 
for manipulating phenomena. In my understanding, this distinction is not between two 
types of models; rather it is between different aspects of models, especially in molecular 
biology, where mechanistic models might explain but they might also suggest new 
interventionist strategies. However, only a few mechanistic models in molecular biology 
have been directly involved in the development of experimental strategies. Therefore, 
certain mechanistic models must possess virtues that make them better ‘models for’ 
rather than simply ‘models of’. In this article I want to understand in virtue of what 
models may be a good ‘models for’.  
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 The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 2, I will introduce the 
received view on ‘models of’ in molecular biology (2.1) and some preliminary 
considerations on why we should distinguish them from ‘models for’ (2.2, 2.3, 2.4). In 
Section 3, I will discuss more in detail ‘models for’ by reconstructing the history of the 
development of the model of the restriction-modification systems which embeds 
important aspects of ‘models for’. The main thesis is that whether a ‘model’ counts as a 
‘model of’ or a ‘model for’ depends on a cognitive disposition of the modeler towards the 
model. A modeler will look at a model as a ‘model of’ if he/she is interested in its 
explanatory force, or as a ‘model for’ if the interest lies in the material manipulations it 
affords. In section 4, I will distinguish two cognitive dispositions behind ‘models of’ and 
‘models for’, namely an epistemic disposition and a disposition towards affordances. 
Such dispositions ‘prescribe’ the way the model will be treated, developed, and 
evaluated. In other words, these cognitive dispositions ‘prescribe’ the virtues that 
modelers usually look for in a model. In section 5, I will identify ‘portability’ as a 
complex and fundamental virtue of ‘models for’. 
 
2 ‘MODELS OF’ AND ‘MODELS FOR’ IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
 
Although the distinction between ‘models of’ and ‘models for’ captures important aspects 
of models in molecular biology, philosophy of biology has mainly focused on models 
considered under the (epistemic) aspects of ‘models of’.  
One may object that in philosophy of biology the relation between mechanistic 
models and interventionist/manipulative strategies has been extensively analyzed. 
However, in these cases philosophers have focused on material manipulations with 
explanatory or realist issues in mind, rather than being concerned about what models in 
molecular biology allow us to do independently of these epistemic issues. Let me 
introduce more precisely the distinction.  
 
2.1 ‘Models of’ in molecular biology 
The aim of molecular biology is to explain biological phenomena (e.g. protein synthesis, 
cell cycle) in light of macromolecules (e.g. nucleotides, amino acids, etc) that compose it. 
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In philosophy of biology, the received view (Tabery, Piotrowska and Darden 2015) 
assumes that the unit of explanation of molecular biology is the mechanistic model 
(Bechtel and Abrahamasen 2005), namely a description of how biological components 
are organized in order to produce a specific biological phenomenon (Machamer et al 
2000). The more a mechanistic model (or a description) can depict precisely the way 
macromolecules are organized to fully account for the phenomenon, the more the 
biological phenomenon is explained. This view is also endorsed by prominent molecular 
biologists (Weinberg 1985; Alberts 2012). Therefore, models of phenomena - in the sense 
of accurate representations of phenomena – play a crucial explanatory role in molecular 
biology. Consider for instance the model of CRISPR-Cas system (Figure 1).  
 
The CRISPR-Cas system is the immune system of specific bacteria and archea 
(Hille and Charpentier 2016). The CRISPR-Cas9 model was originally conceived as a 
‘model of’; the target system (CRISPR-Cas9 system) of the model was studied by 
microbiologists in order to explain the functioning of such a system (Zhang 2015, p 409). 
 5 
This immune system works as follows (I draw extensively from Makarova et al (2015)). 
A CRISPR locus consists of a CRISPR array (‘Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short 
Palindromic Repeats’) – namely a series of nucleotide repeats - separated by short 
variable DNA sequences called ‘spacers’. Such spacers are composed by integrated 
foreign DNA sequences. The CRISPR array is flanked by several cas genes (Cas stands 
for ‘CRISPR-associated’). The mechanism of CRISPR-Cas is composed of three main 
stages. The first stage has been called adaptation, when fragments of foreign DNA from 
invading viruses are incorporated into the CRISPR array as new ‘spacers’. These provide 
the sequence memory for a targeted defense against subsequent invasions by the 
corresponding virus. The second stage is expression, namely when the CRISPR array is 
transcribed and matured to produce CRISPR RNAs (crRNAs). Finally, there is the 
interference. This is when crRNAs, aided by Cas proteins, function as guides to 
specifically target and cleave the nucleic acids of specific foreign viruses. Figure 1 
provides the typical diagram used to represent such a mechanism. If mechanistic models 
explain, then the model of Figure 1 is seen as explanatory of how the immune system of 
certain bacteria and archea works. This model describes how certain entities (DNA 
molecules, proteins, etc) work together to produce a specific phenomenon. Describing 
and representing accurately the causal structure of a phenomenon is here explanatory of 
the phenomenon itself.  
How should ‘accurate’ be understood? Why is CRISPR-Cas9 model a good 
model? Such questions have fuelled a vivid debate, in particular around Craver’s work 
(Bechtel and Abrahamasen 2005; Craver 2006; 2007; Kaplan and Craver 2011; Levy and 
Bechtel 2013; Levy 2014).  
First, successful mechanistic explanations describe the causal structure of the 
world, i.e. how a phenomenon is constitutively produced and/or maintained by causally 
relevant components. In Craver’s work (but in Bechtel and Richardson 2010 as well), 
causal relevance and explanation are intimately connected, and the idea of ‘control’ plays 
a pivotal role. Craver draws extensively from Woodward’s account of causation (2003), 
in the sense that causal relationships can be identified by the fact that they are 
“potentially exploitable for the purpose of manipulation and control” (Craver 2007, p 94). 
For this reason, the account is related to the idea of ‘intervention’, i.e. a manipulation that 
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changes the value of a variable1. To simplify, X is causally relevant to Y if we can 
manipulate Y in conditions W by manipulating X2. Entities described in the CRISPR-
Cas9 model are causally relevant to bacterial immunity in this sense. 
Next, according to Craver (2006; 2007), a mechanistic model is accurate (i.e. it 
explains) when the description of the causal structure of a phenomenon is not just a mere 
conjecture of how that phenomenon could be produced. It must involve a description of a 
causal structure involving real components and real activities. When I say ‘real’ I mean 
that they have to correspond to entities in the world causally relevant to the phenomenon 
(Kaplan and Craver 2011). The gold standard for a mechanistic explanation is that it 
should include all the relevant features of the mechanism we investigate. This is what 
distinguishes a ‘complete’ and adequate mechanistic explanation from a mere how-
possibly model or a mechanistic sketch. However, including all relevant features is not an 
easy concept to spell out. Craver (2006; 2007; Kaplan and Craver 2011) provides detailed 
discussions of this issue, and even though he is focused in neuroscience, his accounts 
works for disciplines such as cell biology or molecular genetics as well (see Craver and 
Darden 2013). The model should account for the explanandum by describing its causal 
structure in terms of components (both entities and activities) that should be clearly 
identified. In (2007, chapter 4) he enriches this picture by adding that an adequate 
explanation needs to spell out precisely the nature of constitutive explanatory relevance 
of components. In (Kaplan and Craver 2011) he further reinforces such norms by 
clarifying that – at least in neuroscience – there is a ‘model-to-mechanism-mapping’ 
requirement (i.e. 3M constraint) that rules out inadequate explanations; variables in the 
models should correspond to real entities and activities that are deemed relevant to the 
phenomenon, and dependencies among components should capture relations among real 
components.  
Craver’s claims of ‘completeness’ of explanations have attracted criticisms (Levy 
and Bechtel 2013; Levy 2014). First, a ‘complete’ description is impossible. As Levy and 
Bechtel (2013) point out, “[m]any, perhaps all, descriptions are abstract in some respects 
and degrees” (p 242). Moreover, Levy (2014) emphasizes the distinction between 
                                                
1 The idea of ‘intervention’ and ‘manipulation’ should not be conflated with ‘human agency’ 
2 Importantly, one does not need to be able actually manipulate X, i.e. the intervention can be 
simply ‘ideal’ and a variable may not be accessible directly for several reasons 
 7 
sketches (i.e. models lacking relevant details) and abstractions (i.e. models leaving out 
irrelevant details) by emphasizing that in neuroscience some models may be explanatory 
when they leave out (irrelevant) details. 
In my opinion, there are two debates here that should not be conflated. First, there 
is a debate internal to the philosophy of neuroscience. Levy criticizes Craver for his 
interpretation of Hodgkin-Huxley model and of modeling strategies in neuroscience, in 
particular when it comes to Craver’s emphasis on molecular details. Next, there is the 
debate about abstraction and mechanistic explanation in general and this looks less 
controversial than the former. This is because even Craver stresses that claims on ‘how-
actually’ models and ‘completeness’ have to be understood with two important 
limitations. First, they are always relative to a certain context. Second, ‘how-actually’ 
and completeness are regulative ideals which cannot be achieved and that “[b]etween 
sketches and complete descriptions lies a continuum of mechanism schemata” (2006, p 
360). Furthermore, too many details can make difficult the task of clearly depicting the 
organization. Even if we have the ideal of completeness in mind, “practices of abstraction 
and idealization sit comfortably with the realist objectives of a mechanistic science” 
(Kaplan and Craver 2011, p 610). 
 In molecular biology (and specifically cell biology or molecular genetics), the 
issue of completeness and abstraction is not as problematic. Typical molecular biologists 
(such as cell biologists, etc) focus on the components and activities that make a 
difference or that they are causally relevant in a specific context (Love and Nathan 2015). 
This can be done by emphasizing the aspects relating the notions of ‘intervention’ and 
causal relevance as stressed by Craver (2007) or analogously by other authors (e.g. 
Strevens 2008). But unlike Levy’s remarks about neuroscience, in the case of disciplines 
as cell biology or molecular genetics depicting precisely the properties of (causally 
relevant) components is often very important. Abstracting from irrelevant details and 
having in mind Craver’s discussions of what counts as a good ‘model of’ should not be 
understood as in tension, because such features would apply only to the causally relevant 
components.  
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2.2 ‘Models for’: The case of CRISPR-Cas9 
Let us consider again the model of the CRISPR-Cas system (Figure 1), though from 
another perspective.  
 The model of CRISPR-Cas meets the criteria that a model must possess to be 
explanatory, but its importance hardly lies in its explanatory force. It is worth knowing 
more about bacteria and archea, but the attentions received by this model have nothing to 
do with bacteria and archea per se. As Zhang says, “[i]n the past 5 years (…) attention 
shifted to developing CRISPR/Cas9 as a powerful tool for biological research (…) for 
genome editing and manipulation” (2015, p 409). Apart from its explanatory purposes, 
this model is a ‘model for’ when we focus on how it suggests new potential ways of 
doing genome editing. To use Jiang and Doudna’s own words, this bacterial defense 
mechanism has been, “repurposed as a powerful RNA-guided DNA targeting platform 
for genome editing, transcriptional perturbation, epigenetic modulation, and genome 
imaging” (p 507, emphasis added). This means that components of the model of 
CRISPR-Cas9 have been ‘resituated’ in a different context. By context here I mean the 
biological context for which a model is deemed to be relevant. In the case of ‘models of’, 
the biological context is defined by the phenomenon to explain3. For instance, the 
material modifications exercised on the ‘real’ components are evaluated and interpreted 
in light of the whole response of the explanandum, i.e. how modified components modify 
the explanandum. When I say that the context of ‘models for’ is different, I mean that we 
do not evaluate the model – as a ‘model for’ – in light of the phenomenon that the model 
– as a ‘model of’ – is purported to explain. Instead, the context of ‘models for’ is any 
biological context where the interventionist strategies they suggest can be useful. 
When I say that components of CRISPR-Cas9 model have been resituated in 
another context, I mean that a single RNA-guided Cas9 that can cleave specific targeted 
DNA sequence has been ‘redirected’ for programmed DNA cleavage (Jinek et al 2012). 
Such a single RNA-guided Cas9 does in other contexts the same thing that it does in the 
context of bacterial immunity, but it does this with different purposes (i.e. it does not 
contribute to bacterial immunity), where ‘purposes’ are specified by those who exploit its 
                                                
3 This aspect is emphasized in several works about mechanistic explanation (see in particular 
Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013; Darden 2006). 
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capacities. Unlike in mechanistic ‘models of’, interventionist strategies must be actual 
and they are strictly related to human agency.  
The same model can be used both to represent/explain and as a guide to 
manipulate experimental systems in multiple contexts; it is the same model but looked in 
light of different desiderata and aims. In other words, instead of looking at models to 
establish if they explain, we look at models to find something that can be ‘repurposed’ 
elsewhere. The components of the model are used with different purposes in mind; when 
models are considered ‘models of’, components are considered as parts of an explanation, 
unlike in models as ‘models for’ where components are seen as potentially triggering 
specific effects in other contexts.  
 
2.3 Importance of ‘models for’ 
Models like CRISPR-Cas9 - as ‘models for’ - play a prominent role in molecular biology. 
Biologists, by reasoning on them, develop new ways of manipulating biological entities, 
which are then used to investigate phenomena that were at first inaccessible. The history 
of molecular biology is replete with such examples. For instance, the model of reverse 
transcriptase in 1970 (Temin and Mizutani 1970) has been used to develop tools for gene 
cloning. As Morange puts it, “its discovery (…) in fact provided one of the most 
important tools of genetic engineering” (1998, p 172). Another important example is 
DNA polymerase which was characterized by Arthur Kornberg in 1955, and then it has 
been ‘repurposed’ in many ways, which will be exposed in detail below.  
These examples are related to the importance of experiments in molecular 
biology. In several cases, strategies of discovery in science have been characterized by 
philosophers of science as (cognitive) strategies for discovering mechanisms (Bechtel and 
Richardson 2010). When it comes to molecular biology, these strategies are instantiated 
mostly in terms of experiments. For instance, to localize causally relevant biological 
entities in a phenomenon, we need to materially stimulate or inhibit the phenomenon 
itself (Bechtel and Richardson 2010; see also interlevel experiments in Craver 2007). 
This is related to the observations that Craver does about the idea of intervention and 
causal relevance as developed by Woodward (2003). However, in molecular biology 
what count are only actual manipulations and interventions, and not also ‘ideal’ 
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interventions. The importance of experiments is that they actually (and not possibly) 
provide a material access into biological systems; only by interpreting the responses of 
such systems, do we elaborate a mechanistic description of how the system works. As 
just mentioned, in the history of molecular biology (Rheinberger 2007; Morange 1998), 
models have been exploited to elaborate more precise and effective ways of materially 
manipulating biological phenomena4. These in turn could lead in principle to the 
elaboration of more precise mechanistic models. ‘Models for’ are the engine of progress 
in molecular biology, because they facilitate the possibility of more precise experimental 
manipulations, which are a prominent means for elaborating explanations. 
 
2.4 ‘Models for’ and philosophy of experimentation in biology 
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of ‘models for’, let me 
now distinguish my interest in this aspect of models from seemingly similar analyses.  
Consider for instance the notion of ‘build-it test’ developed by Craver and 
Darden. In (2013), they interpret the ability to modify biological phenomena on the basis 
of their mechanistic models (after all, mechanistic descriptions look like ‘recipes’ for 
constructing phenomena) as a sign of the explanatory force of models. By hypothesizing 
what would happen if entities of a mechanistic description were overexpressed or 
inhibited, and then by materially intervening on the target system accordingly, we would 
have indications about the quality of the mechanistic model. By ‘constructing’ the 
phenomenon, we understand if the model is explanatory. In the case of CRISPR-Cas9 
model, this test would reconstruct the immune system of bacteria in the same context 
where it usually happened (i.e. in prokaryotes). However, my focus is on how 
mechanistic models can be used to elaborate manipulative/interventionist strategies that 
are applied to contexts (in the sense meant above) that are different from the specific 
context for which the model – as a ‘model of’ - is considered relevant. The important 
aspect of the CRISPR-Cas model is that we do not use its specific ‘DNA-cutting’ 
workflow (in the sense of ‘procedure’) to reproduce a phenomenon in order to understand 
                                                
4 Please note that models, ‘as models for’, are not the experimental strategy itself. Rather, they are 
a source used to develop the strategy/experimental protocol 
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if we have a good explanation of it (i.e. the ‘build.it’ test), but rather we want to use the 
workflow to manipulate other phenomena.  
The same could be said also for scholarships focused on the experimental nature 
of molecular biology. For instance, Weber’s Philosophy of Experimental Biology (2005) 
is centered on issues that “concern the ways in which scientific knowledge is structured, 
how it explains natural phenomena, how it is generated and evaluated, and how it 
connects to the world” (p 5). As in the ‘build-it’ test, the interest is directly in epistemic 
issues. Surely, ‘models for’ are important tools to devise experimental strategies which in 
turn will be used to explain other phenomena. But models as ‘models for’ are not 
interesting because they answer directly to epistemic problems. Rather, they inspire 
interventionist strategies that, per se, are not intended to show the causal relevance of the 
components of the model involved. While for some scholars successful and robust 
experimental use of entities (Hacking 1983) are intended to show that certain entities 
exist5 and/or they are causally relevant, seeing models as ‘models for’ assumes that the 
components of the model are real. 
 Moreover, one may connect the idea of ‘models for’ to the rich discussion made 
by Rheinberger about experimental systems (understood as the phenomenon to explain 
and the material tools to constrain it) and practices of molecular biology (1997a; 1997b). 
Biologists reduce the epistemic complexity of biological phenomena (i.e. the fact that 
they have limited access to the phenomenon itself) by constraining and manipulating 
systems (both conceptually and materially) in various ways. For this reason, Rheinberger 
focuses his research on the details of epistemic and experimental practices. He also 
emphasizes different ways in which experimental systems may be combined. This sounds 
similar to the idea of ‘models for’, in the sense that we combine pieces of different 
models (or experimental systems, even though they are not exactly the same thing) in 
order to do something different from the aims of the contexts where the pieces have been 
extracted. However, in my understanding Rheinberger’s descriptions of such 
combinations (i.e. conjunctures, linkages or hybridizations) focus especially on how the 
combination of techniques or concepts from different disciplines/communities leads to 
                                                
5 For the philosophy of biology, see in particular the project From Biological Practice to 
Scientific Metaphysics at http://biological-practice-to-metaphysics.org/  
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new concepts or new representations of a phenomenon. When ‘models for’ are 
concerned, my focus is directly related to what these models allow us to do, and only 
indirectly related to the epistemic consequences. 
 
3 ‘MODELS FOR’ AND THE DISCOVERY OF RESTRICTION-
MODIFICATION SYSTEMS  
 
The characteristics of good ‘models for’ will be further investigated by reconstructing an 
important episode of the history of biology. This is the characterization of restriction-
modification systems of bacteria and their exploitation for developing various techniques 
widely used in molecular biology, (e.g. DNA cloning and mapping). This particular 
episode shows very well how the scientists’ interest can shift to different aspects (‘model 
of’ and ‘model for’) of the same model. 
 
3.1 Material access through restriction enzymes: a tale of three Noble Laureates 
The restriction-modification system (RM-system) is a mechanism of defense of bacteria 
used against bacteriophages (i.e. a virus infecting and replicating in bacteria). Such a 
mechanism of defense works as follows (see Figure 2). First, a bacteriophage invades a 
bacterium (from now on, the host cell). Once this happens, the host cell stimulates the 
production of two types of enzymes. The first is called restriction enzyme. A restriction 
enzyme (type II6) cleaves DNA at specific sites. This means that it cuts only specific 
short sequences of DNA. Therefore, restriction enzymes ‘recognize’ DNA sequences of 
the invading entities, and by cleaving they block the invasion. However, a restriction 
enzyme does not distinguish between the DNA of the bacteriophage and the DNA of the 
host cell. Hence, restriction enzymes may also cleave the DNA of the host cell. For this 
reason, the host cell stimulates the production of another enzyme, called modification 
enzyme. This enzyme methylates the DNA of the host cell where the restriction enzyme 
would cleave. By doing that, the specific DNA locus of the host cell is not recognized by 
the restriction enzyme. Werner Arber, Hamilton Smith and Daniel Nathans were awarded 
                                                
6 There are at least five types of restriction enzymes. The most relevant here are Type II because 
they are the most commonly exploited 
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the Nobel Prize in 1978 for the characterization of this phenomenon and its exploitation. 
Yet, Arber and Smith on the one hand, and Nathans on the other were awarded the prize 
for different reasons, which in part reflect the distinction between ‘models of’ and 
‘models for’. 
 
The origin of the discovery of RM-systems lies in some studies in the 1950s 
showing that bacteriophages grown on one strain of bacteria could not grow similarly in 
others (Roberts 2005, p 5905). At first, this seemed to suggest that “the efficiency with 
which phage infected new bacterial hosts depended on the host on which they previously 
grew” (Loenen et al 2014, p 4). Therefore, the hypothesis was that certain abilities of 
bacteriophages – acquired by means of an unknown mechanism - created this difference.  
Later, Arber accumulated enough evidence to support the idea that host cells were 
responsible for the curious phenomenon. Arber’s lab proposed a new model to fully 
account for the mysterious phenomenon. He hypothesized that bacteria cells must contain 
two specific types of enzymes. The first (later identified as an endonuclease) has the 
function of cleaving specific sequences of DNA. The second (later identified as a 
methyltransferase) recognizes and modifies the same specific sequence on the host DNA 
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preventing its destruction by the restriction enzyme (Arber 1965)7. Arber proposed this 
mechanism as a sketch rather than a schema or as a how-plausibly/actually model 
because the two enzymes were only later isolated. Therefore, Arber’s model is not a case 
of abstraction, because he failed to identify relevant components. If Arber had just 
elaborated a sketch, it is not clear why he was awarded the prize in the first place. The 
Nobel Academy said it was both for the discovery of restriction enzymes and because he 
“postulated that these enzymes bind to DNA at specific sites containing recurring 
structural elements made up of specific base-pair sequences (…) He proposed that DNA 
molecules contain specific sites with the capacity to bind both types of enzymes”8. 
However, this is imprecise. While he postulated the existence of restriction enzymes, he 
discovered in 1968 a specific restriction enzyme (i.e. EcoBI) that is not sequence-
specific. This was in a sense a self-defeating discovery, because at first he postulated the 
existence of a specific type of entity with specific features, but later that entity turned out 
to have different properties. Therefore, the main reason why Arber was awarded was 
because he “had provided the theoretical framework that described the biology of 
restriction and modification” (Roberts 2005, p 5907). Since in 1978 The Nobel Academy 
decided to award the prize “for discoveries with far reaching consequences for genetics”9, 
despite the ‘black boxes’ in Arber’s model the importance of this work was apparent. 
Hamilton Smith won the prize as well. Smith (Smith and Wilcox 1970) 
characterized and isolated the first sequence-specific restriction enzyme (a Type II 
restriction enzyme called R endonuclease) in the immune system of Haemophilus 
Influenziae, thereby filling a black box in Arber’s model10, and then he moved to other 
research interests. The Academy motivated the award by saying that Smith “verified 
Arber's hypothesis with a purified bacterial restriction enzyme and showed that this 
                                                
7 In (Arber 1965) methylation is proposed as “a likely basis for modification” (Gitschier 2014, p 
4). In other articles before that, Arber hypothesized several other mechanisms for the 
modification part of RM-systems 
8 https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1978/press.html 
9 https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1978/press.html 
10 Another important black box was filled in 1972 by Kuhnlein and Arber himself when they 
isolated the first modification enzyme 
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enzyme cuts DNA in the middle of a specific symmetrical sequence”11. To use the 
mechanistic jargon, Smith improved Arber’s sketch towards a how-actually model. 
 Nathans was awarded the prize for a work on RM-systems too, but not because he 
further improved the model by identifying other entities. Strictly speaking, Nathans did 
not discover anything. Rather, he used the model as inspiration to elaborate a technique to 
obtain the first ‘physical’ map of the DNA of a virus (Nathans and Danna 1971). The 
Academy drew a contrast between Arber and Smith on the one hand, and Nathans on the 
other. Nathans was not awarded for a discovery, but because he “pioneered the 
application of restriction enzymes to genetics (…) and developed and applied new 
methodology involving restriction enzymes to solve various problems in genetics”12. By 
Nathans’s account, Arber’s model suggested new interventionist strategies: 
 
“From the incisive work of Arber and his colleagues (…) and the biochemical characterization of 
purified restriction enzymes by (…) Smith & Wilcox, it seemed likely (as first suggested by 
Arber) that restriction enzymes could be used to digest DNA molecules into specific fragments” 
(1978, 2) 
 
Therefore, Arber’s model has been used to develop new techniques to facilitate the 
manipulation of biological systems which are different from bacteriophages. Since 
restriction enzymes cut and paste at specific recognition sites, Nathans exploited this 
workflow “to cleave DNA from the SV40 virus into fragments, and thus make what 
would be later called ‘a physical map’ of the viral genome,” (Morange 1998, p 187). Note 
that Nathans ‘moved’ restriction enzymes from the context of bacteria to the context of 
tumor viruses (i.e. SV40). If in the ‘model of’ the biological context is the 
bacteriophage’s RM-system (i.e. the explanandum), in ‘model for’ the context is any 
system where the restriction enzyme could be used (in this case, tumor viruses). But 
‘repurposing’ restriction enzymes in this way goes beyond tumor viruses. Weinberg 
(1985) stresses the usefulness of restriction enzymes in other contexts; they “establish 
convenient, fixed, landmarks along the otherwise featureless terrain of DNA molecules” 
(p 51). Restriction enzymes are used to cut any long DNA molecule into discrete 
                                                
11 https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1978/press.html 
12 https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1978/press.html 
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fragments, which are smaller and more amenable to be analyzed, and they have been used 
also to develop early sequencing technologies and techniques of gene cloning (Weinberg 
1985).  
 
3.2 RM-system model as a ‘model for’ and a ‘model of’ 
Arber’s model, understood as a ‘model for’, has been repurposed in a different biological 
context in order to manipulate other biological entities. Which are the features of RM-
system model that made it a successful ‘model for’?   
The model of RM-systems was conceived and treated as a ‘model of’ both by 
Arber and Smith. Starting from Arber’s sketch, biologists tried progressively to complete 
it in a way that could make sense of the phenomenon observed. As I have already 
noticed, the philosophical literature has a list of criteria that mechanistic models – 
conceived as ‘models of’ - should met to be good models. Let us see whether some of 
these virtues were embedded by Arber’s model and whether they can explain why this 
model was successful as a ‘model for’.  
 It seems to me that Arber’s model originally was a paradigmatic case of an 
incomplete how-possibly model because the two most important entities (the restriction 
enzyme and the modification enzyme) were merely hypothesized. This is not abstraction, 
since the enzymes were causally relevant in Arber’s interpretation of the phenomenon. 
Moreover, Arber speculated that restriction and modification enzymes had to be 
sequence-specific but the first restriction enzyme he isolated was not sequence-specific. 
Even when Smith isolated the sequence-specific endonuclease R, Arber’s model 
remained largely incomplete, since evidence of the first ‘modification’ enzyme was 
reported only in 1972. To use mechanistic jargon, in 1971 – when Nathans exploited RM-
system model – the RM-system model was just a mechanism sketch; it could not fully 
account for the phenomenon and most of its entities and activities were merely 
hypothesized. The idea, for instance, of the 3M constraint and in general the fact that 
entities and activities must be real is not met. Hypothesized components are understood 
as being causally relevant, but establishing causal relevance requires that such 
components should be more than fictional. The only aspect that Arber (and Smith as 
well) correctly spelled out was the organization (i.e. the causal connectivity) between the 
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hypothesized key entities. However, understanding correctly the organization is not 
enough for a mechanistic model to be adequate and hence good ‘models of’ and ‘models 
for’ do not share necessarily the same features.  
 
4. EPISTEMIC DISPOSITION AND DISPOSITION TOWARDS AFFORDANCES  
 
Let me now turn again to the fact that the model is treated both as a ‘model of’ and ‘a 
model for’ by scientists (Evelyn Fox Keller in 2000 suggests a similar idea); it seems that 
scientists themselves decide whether a model should count as a ‘model of’ or a ‘model 
for’. This can be explained by appealing to a sort of cognitive disposition of the scientist 
towards the use of the model. The disposition establishes whether we should focus on the 
explanatory force of the model or if components of the model should be ‘repurposed’ 
elsewhere. By ‘cognitive disposition’ I mean a tendency to look at and reason over 
things through a particular lens or from a specific angle. By ‘reasoning over’ I mean that 
these dispositions somehow prescribe the criteria employed to analyze and appraise the 
specific analysandum under scrutiny.  
 
4.1 Two cognitive dispositions towards models 
Smith treated Arber’s model as a ‘model of’, and in that respect he aimed to complete the 
model by identifying specific enzymes postulated in the model. If we treat the model as a 
model of a biological phenomenon, then we look for specific features of the model and 
not others. I call the cognitive disposition of looking at models as ‘models of phenomena’ 
epistemic disposition because it focuses scientists’ attention to matters of explanatory 
force or representational adequacy of a model with respect to the target system. Because 
of this disposition, the biologist will only ask specific questions such as “Does this model 
fully account for the phenomenon under scrutiny? Is this model explanatory?”. Therefore, 
Smith looked at RM-system model as something lacking some important components 
that needed to be identified. In other words, he looked at Arber’s model as something to 
be improved in its explanatory force. If we have to work on Arber’s model from the 
standpoint of the epistemic disposition, we will ask fir whether that model meets Craver’s 
criteria adequately.  
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By contrast, Nathans looked at Arber’s model (improved by Smith) as a ‘model 
for’, trying to ‘resituate’ (Morgan 2014) some components into a different biological 
context to design a new experimental technique. Nathans treated this model and the kind 
of information embedded in it as a vehicle for potential material manipulations in other 
contexts.  
Smith and Nathans had different interests. This is clear both from Nathans’ Nobel 
Prize Lecture and other sources13. As a matter of fact, Nathans was not interested in 
bacteriophages per se, but rather he was interested in tumor viruses. In particular, while 
he was trying to understand “how to approach the genetics of SV40 in a sort of combined 
genetic and chemical way” (Schlesinger 1979), he received a letter from Smith about the 
restriction endonuclease in Haemophilus Influenzae. While Smith abandoned the topic of 
restriction enzymes, Nathans continued the research with a different spin, and he focused 
on how Arber’s model and Smith’s work could be used to study the DNA of SV40 
(Brownlee 2005). This is looking at Arber’s model as something to be ‘repurposed’ in 
another context. In particular, Nathans and one of his students assayed “the activity on 
SV40 DNA of various restriction enzymes” (Schlesinger 1979). Therefore, the appeal to 
‘cognitive dispositions’ is supported by Nathans’ account of the episode since it is 
Nathans’ aims and intentions that had him to treat the model as a ‘model for’ and not 
necessarily some features of the model itself. 
To qualify this further, Nathans looked at Arber’s model from the standpoint of 
what I call a disposition towards affordances14. The idea of ‘affordance’ comes from 
psychology. It has been introduced by James Gibson and later popularized in the context 
of Human-Machine Interaction by Norman (1999). Though there is an evolution of the 
concept, here I will use just the basic meaning of the concept of ‘affordance’. An 
affordance is a property of an object that suggests how to interact with or use that object. 
While for Gibson ‘affordances’ exist independently of the observer, the fact that they can 
be ‘exploited’ depends on the actor interacting with the environment. Models, when 
                                                
13 See in particular Schlesinger’s interview to Nathans in 1979 at 
http://beckerexhibits.wustl.edu/oral/transcripts/nathans.html 
14 By drawing a distinction between the two different cognitive dispositions, I do not mean to say 
a biologist in his/her life cultivates either the one or the other. Actually, molecular biology 
curricula emphasize both aspects 
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considered as ‘models for’, may afford experimental strategies, but the fact that one can 
see them depends on whether she has the right disposition towards the model. In 
molecular biology, it is common to look for affordances in mechanistic models to solve 
experimental problems in a different context. Therefore, Nathans ‘imagined’ a 
component of Arber’s model in a different biological context serving a different purpose 
than in the original context, i.e. to solve the problem of how to reduce the length of DNA 
strands in a controlled way. Through this disposition towards affordances, a scientist is 
not interested in whether a model accurately explains a phenomenon. Rather, this 
disposition sets scientists’ focus on how we can use a part of a model to solve a problem 
raised in another context. It is important to stress this idea once more; it is up to human 
agency whether to treat a model as a ‘model for’ because nothing in the model per se 
discriminates between ‘model of’ and ‘model for’ (even though there are models that are 
better ‘equipped’ to be ‘models for’ or ‘models of’). As I said, ‘models of’ and ‘models 
for’ are not two types of models, but rather aspects of the same model. It is in light of 
scientists’ aims and interests that a model is treated in a way or another and the scientist 
can go back and forth depending on her interests and intentions. Moreover, we need the 
appeal to cognitive dispositions and intentions in order to make sense of the fact that 
resituating a model in a specific context rather than another is a function, again, of 
scientists’ interests and intentions. 
 
4.2 Intentions in philosophy of science and studies of scientific cognition 
The appeal to (cognitive) dispositions or intentions and the inclusion of the agent in the 
equation of modelling are hardly new things (Giere 2004; Van Fraassen 2008). However, 
my impression is that some philosophers of science have for the most part only invoked – 
rather than analyzed in detail – the role of agents and intentions. 
 For instance, Giere (2004; 2010) focuses on the activity of representing. He says 
that the mere focus on the representation and the target system is not enough, because the 
activity is done by agents; “[s]ince scientists are intentional agents with goals and 
purposes, I propose explicitly to provide a space for purposes in my understanding of 
representational practices in science” (Giere 2004, p 743). His attention is on the purpose 
of learning something from models, and how models represent reality. My analysis 
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differs from Giere’s in at least two respects. First, I provide a ‘taxonomy’ (though 
preliminary) of different types of ‘intentions’ within a specific scientific field. I show 
precisely how specific intentions/dispositions can make sense of different practices 
within the same discipline. Moreover, unlike in Giere’s account, here I am not interested 
in explaining how models represent and how similarity should be understood, but rather 
in why and how mechanistic models are used in different ways. 
 Intentions and purposes make one important appearance in Weisberg’s discussion 
of similarity (2013) as well. When one has to establish which features should be 
considered to measure similarity between a model and the target system, Weisberg says 
that we should make explicit modeler’s intended scope. This is a mixture of intentions, 
purposes (e.g. research goals) and background theory. Weisberg’s discussion of purposes 
is rich, and it is spelled out in terms of representational ideals, namely those goals 
governing modeling. However, intentions play only an indirect role, and in my 
understanding they are invoked to make sense of the claim that scientists choose among 
ideals. Here I am more explicit about the specific contribution of dispositions and 
intentions. Moreover, the intended scope and fidelity criteria Weisberg considers in 
modeling are related to what I call the epistemic disposition. This is clear from the 
components of representational ideals, namely inclusion rules and fidelity rules. These 
specify properties of the target system to include in the model, and the degrees of 
precision and accuracy used to judge the model, but only under similarity concerns 
which, in a sense, are typically concerns of the epistemic disposition. Weisberg’s 
representational ideals are all related either to similarity or to explanatory purposes, while 
my interest, as I have emphasized, is not entirely in such goals. 
 Knuuttilla’s works on models (2005; 2011) is relevant here. I am sympathetic 
with her emphasis on the multitude of activities on models beyond representation and the 
relation of ‘model/target system’. However, we have different goals. Knuuttilla is 
interested in understanding the complex relation between intentionality and materiality in 
the diverse uses of models beyond the mere representational activities.  While here I want 
to show how specific types of cognitive dispositions can make sense of the practices of a 
specific discipline, Knuuttilla is more focused – as far as I understand - in uncovering the 
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multiple relations between the medium of models and their intended uses and how one 
informs the other and viceversa. 
 I should also emphasize that studies of scientific cognitions can in principle shed 
light on some of the cognitive dynamics of ‘models of’ and ‘models for’ (Nersessian 
2002). First, studies on scientific cognition are grounded in a problem-solving 
framework. Philosophical studies in molecular biology (Bechtel and Richardson 2010) 
assume that problem-solving is a fundamental way biologists reason. Next, I have 
interpreted Nathans’ narrative of his work (but Kary Mullis’ account of PCR might be 
interpreted similarly) as embedded in the ‘mental modelling’ framework (Nersessian 
2002). Mental modelling based on the idea that “in many instances people reason by 
carrying out thought experiments on internal models” (p 139), and this is especially true 
for reasoning about causality in physical systems. It seems that when biologists treat 
models as ‘models for’ and they abstract components of a model and imagine them in 
another context, they exhibit several types of mental modelling types listed in cognitive 
science literature, such as analogical, visual and simulative modelling. Finally, studies of 
scientific cognition in biomedical engineering in particular (see for instance MacLeod 
and Nersessian 2013) have shown how scientists abstract and combine pieces of models 
to create new epistemic or material tools.  
 
5. VIRTUES OF ‘MODELS FOR’ 
 
Being a good ‘model for’ does not necessarily require Craver’s epistemic virtues. 
However, this is just a negative characterization. Which are exactly the virtues of good 
‘models for’? Here I sketch a preliminary taxonomy of such virtues. Since I have 
emphasized that the unit of analysis is not only the model and the target system, but that 
also the ‘modeler’ plays a role, I first establish that there are two categories of virtues for 
‘models for’. First, there are virtues of models connecting the model to its target system, 
and next there are virtues connecting the model to the modeler. 
 
 
 
 22 
5.1 ‘Models for’, target systems and portability 
In the case of ‘models of’, the target system is the phenomenon we want to explain. In the 
case of ‘models for’, the target system is the set of experimental systems where the 
dynamics described by the model can be successfully implemented. 
When ‘models for’ and their target systems are concerned, an important virtue is 
what Floridi calls portability (2011; but see also Leonelli 2015). In a different context, 
Floridi defines portability “as to the ease with which a piece of software or a file format 
can be ‘ported’, i.e. made to run on a new platform and/or to compile with a new 
compiler” (2011, p 357)15. Portability here is the ease with which pieces of mechanistic 
models could be used and combined to solve problems in a different biological context. 
When one looks at Arber’s model from the standpoint of the disposition towards 
affordances, one does not consider whether Arber’s model scores high in Craver’s 
virtues, but rather if some of its components could plausibly have interesting functions in 
other contexts or can be implemented successfully in a different context in order to supply 
a stimulus to the new target of study16.  
In order for a model to be portable, there are a few requirements that should be 
met. First, not the entire model must be portable. In fact, only a few components will do, 
but it is the entire model that is a model ‘for’ because the biologists think about 
resituating components by reasoning on the model as a whole, and by abstracting 
something from it. A consequence of this is that the components that we want to 
‘resituate’ must be real. The whole model does not need to be ‘complete’ or ‘how-
actually’, but specific components should be clearly identified. As I mentioned above, 
entity realism (in the sense of components of the model corresponding to real entities in 
the world) in ‘models for’ is not the aim, but it is an assumption. We do not manipulate 
entities for the purpose of showing that they are real, but we use such entities in another 
context under the assumption that they are real. Nathans was not in the position to treat 
                                                
15 Floridi’s context is the evaluation of ontologies. A portable ontology is one that could be made 
‘run’ in many possible worlds. 
16 Something akin to ‘portability’ may work also for ‘model of’, though it has a different function, 
and it has a different name. A ‘models of’ is highly portable if it can capture the dynamics of 
several target systems. This has been called schema, and portability in such a context has been 
also named generality, namely “the number of (…) target a particular model applies to” 
(Weisberg 2013, p 109) 
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Arber’s model as a ‘model for’ until Smith filled a black-box in Arber’s model with the 
identification of the restriction enzyme. In CRISPR-Cas9 model there is ‘something’ that 
cleaves DNA and it is guided in an effective way, but unless we identify this ‘something’ 
as a RNA guided by a specific protein, we would not be able to use it in another 
biological context because we would not know what to use. Moreover, while not all the 
components must be real, still the organization of the model must be correctly spelled 
out. This is because knowing the type of causal relevance that a component has for a 
phenomenon can give us an idea of whether such role can be fulfilled in another context. 
In the case of restriction enzymes and crRNAs, their function is to cut DNA and it seems 
that they do selectively not necessarily because of the specific organization of the 
mechanism embedded in the explanandum; this suggests that they can be easily resituate 
elsewhere to do the same thing (even though for a different purpose). Relatedly, the 
components of the original target system that correspond to the components in the model 
have to fulfill the intended activities in the new context. For instance, imagine that the 
single RNA-guided Cas9 could work only in the context of bacteria and archaea. Even 
though the model of CRISPR-Cas9 suggests new strategies of genome editing, the fact 
that such components do not do the same thing in other contexts (notably eukaryotes) 
would make the model way less portable. Therefore, the real components and activities 
that we select should be able to fulfill the same (or a similar) function in many other 
contexts17. Finally, the components of the model we want to resituate must be accessible. 
This is because the interventions we are interested in must be actual. If a component is 
not accessible, it cannot be resituate elsewhere. The more a model is portable in the way I 
described, the more the model is a better ‘model for’. 
An example of high degree of portability is the class of models of DNA 
replication and synthesis. A component of such class of models that has a history of 
successes in being ‘repurposed’ is DNA polymerase. This enzyme is essential for DNA 
replication because it can synthetize molecules of DNA from deoxyribonucleotides. DNA 
polymerase performs its function across many contexts, and this is why its properties may 
be exploited virtually anywhere. The component ‘DNA polymerase’ is highly portable 
because the enzyme has been ‘identified’ (i.e. it is real), it is required anytime there is cell 
                                                
17 Being a portable model is not a yes-or-no quality; being portable is a matter of degree 
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division (i.e. it is compatible with almost every experimental system biologists use) and it 
is accessible. Arthur Kornberg identified the enzyme in the 1950s. Among the other 
applications, DNA polymerase has been ‘repurposed’ by Kary Mullis to develop the so-
called polymerase chain reaction (PCR) (Rabinow 1996). Mullis in the 1980s was 
working for Cetus Corporation to develop an efficient technique to isolate and identify a 
specific sequence of DNA. PCR can amplify a targeted DNA molecule over several 
orders of magnitude, and this can aid the analysis of a targeted molecule. What has been 
‘ported’ of the model of DNA polymerase is its capacity to synthesize DNA molecules; 
in Mullis’ own words “I did not see why one could not use the enzyme DNA 
polymerase” (1990, p 57). Interestingly, Mullis presented the protocol to Lederberg in 
1984, and Lederberg admitted that Kornberg and he “had considered the notion that the 
enzyme could somehow be harnessed to make large quantities of DNA. They had not 
figured out exactly how to do it, however” (Mullis 1990, p 65). In other words, the issue 
is how to control certain components and their function in another context, and this was 
most of Mullis’ work. To generalize this point, the important thing about ‘resituating’ is 
to be able to control the activity of a component in a novel context.   
 
5.2 How-possibly models and schemas 
Affordances suggested by models may be difficult to see. However, sometimes models 
have some characteristics that facilitate the detection of affordances. These 
characteristics, though not necessary for good ‘models for’, are helpful to modelers. 
 One of these is being a ‘how-possibly’ model, strange as this may sound since the 
received view is that being ‘how-possibly’ is actually a deficiency of models18 (Craver 
and Darden 2013). However, a ‘how-actually’ model is so replete with details that is very 
difficult for the biologist to mentally abstract some of its parts and to resituate them in 
other contexts. Therefore, a ‘how-possibly’ model affords better (if, of course, it is 
                                                
18 Again, the way I understand here how-possibly models is not related to abstraction (Levy and 
Bechtel 2013; Levy 2014). For instance, Arber - to use Craver’s jargon -, had no idea if the 
“conjectured’ parts” (2006, p 6) like the enzymes exist. A how-possibly model is a model that 
depict the organizational structure of a phenomenon, but it fails to identify some relevant 
components. This is not the same as in abstraction, where relevant features are identified 
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portable19) than a ‘how-actually’ model because it easier to decontextualize. This is true 
under the condition emphasized above that even if the model is ‘how-possibly’ still the 
component to resituate must be real. Also, this does not mean that good ‘models for’ are 
necessarily ‘how-possibly’ model. Being ‘how-possibly’ is simply a characteristic of the 
model that help the modeler to see the affordances, if there are affordances. However, 
whether the model is a good ‘model for’ will depend on portability, and whether a model 
is portable will depend on the nature of the components of the model. 
 Something similar may be said about schemas (i.e. abstract descriptions of 
mechanisms that can apply across several contexts). The case of schemas make even 
more sense if we look at the literature on how scientific knowledge is transferred from 
one context to another. For instance, Morgan (2014) describes several ways of 
‘resituating knowledge’ to different contexts. In particular, when resituating is from 
local-to-many, modelers have first to desituate “local findings into a somewhat broader 
level (above local but less than general), which can then be available for resituation in 
another local level” (p 1014). To see whether something can work in a different context, 
we have to abstract or decontextualize it from its local context; at a more general level 
‘pieces’ of mechanistic models are less constrained by the locality of the models 
themselves.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Sometimes molecular biologists exploit knowledge of phenomena for experimental 
purposes. In this contribution, I tried to make sense of this by developing Keller’s 
distinction between ‘models of’ and ‘models for’. ‘Models of (phenomena)’ should be 
understood as models representing phenomena, while ‘models for (manipulating 
phenomena)’ are models that suggest new types of material manipulations and 
experimental strategies. The aim of the article was to identify the differences between 
‘model of’ and ‘model for’ and in particular to provide a preliminary characterization of 
the characteristics that make a model a good ‘model for’. However, a study combining 
                                                
19 This means that how-possibly models are not necessarily more portable. Facilitating 
affordances and portability are not connected 
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the perspectives of philosophy of science in practice, studies of scientific cognition and 
history of molecular biology will be fundamental to enrich the picture I proposed. 
By analyzing the history of the characterization of restriction-modification 
systems, I claimed that whether a model is treated as a ‘model of’ or a ‘model for’ will 
depend on a scientist’s cognitive dispositions towards the model. A modeler will look at a 
model in the sense of a ‘model of’ if he/she is interested in the explanatory force of the 
model (i.e. epistemic disposition), or as a ‘model for’ if the interest lies on model’s 
affordances for manipulative strategies (i.e. disposition towards affordances). Such 
dispositions ‘prescribe’ the way the model would be treated and evaluated.  
Virtues of models as ‘models of’ in molecular biology have been extensively 
characterized. On the contrary, the characterization of models from the standpoint of the 
disposition towards affordances has been elusive. For this reason, in the last section I 
have identified an important virtue of ‘models for’. This is called portability, namely the 
ease with which components of mechanistic models could be used and combined to solve 
problems in a different experimental system. Finally, I have also noticed that if a model is 
a ‘how-possibly’ model or a schema, then it is easier to resituate elsewhere, though under 
the assumption that it is portable. 
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